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JOHN COTTINGHAM 
 
 ‘Whatever is emotional is opposed to that true cold reason which I place above all things.’ 
Arthur Conan Doyle1 
 
 
Abstract 
Much contemporary philosophy of religion suffers from an overly abstract and intellectualized 
methodology. A more ‘humane’ approach would acknowledge the vital contribution of the 
emotions and passions to a proper cognitive grasp of the nature of the cosmos and our place within 
it. The point is illustrated by reference to a number of writers, including Descartes, whose path to 
knowledge of God, often thought to depend on dispassionate argument alone, in fact relies on a 
synergy between intellect and emotions. 
  
 
1. Introduction: the limits of philosophical reason 
The prejudice against the emotions goes a long way back in philosophy, in fact right back to a 
significant strand in Plato’s thought, where we are warned that the emotions need to be held in 
check by controlling reason. The famous image in the Phaedrus is of the soul as a chariot, with 
reason as the driver, and two horses, the dark one representing appetites and the lighter one 
representing the spirited element.2 The image has been variously interpreted: some see it as looking 
forward to the Stoic idea of the complete governance of reason and the suppression of the passions; 
others see it as a more harmonious vision in which the various parts of the soul work together, the 
unruly desires needing to be curbed, while the nobler and more spirited desires are natural allies of 
reason, although still requiring a restraining hand. The interpretation of Plato is a complex business, 
and Plato’s thought is itself complex and nuanced enough to resist easy pigeonholing. But I think it 
is fair to say that the prevailing impression many readers have taken away from a number of central 
Platonic texts – the Republic is a notable example – is that the best life, the life of philosophical 
reason, operates on pure rational plane that is as far as possible free from the distortions arising 
from the murky world of the senses and the emotions.3  
From Plato onwards we can find many examples of a ‘ratiocentric’ tendency in philosophy – a 
tendency to give primacy to the role of a certain kind of abstract and detached reasoning in our 
understanding of the world. So Bertrand Russell speaks with enthusiasm of the philosophical ideal 
of the ‘free intellect’: 
 
																																																								
∗This is a typescript of an article the definitive version of which is to appear in a supplementary issue of the 
journal Philosophy, devoted to the theme Emotions and Passions, also to be published by CUP in book form. 
1 The creed of Sherlock Holmes, in Arthur Conan Doyle, The Sign of Four [1890], Ch. 12. 
2 Plato, Phaedrus [c. 370 BCE], 246a–254e.  
3 For a defence of the traditional view of Plato as having a negative attitude to the emotions, see Stephen 
Leighton, ‘The Value of Passion in Plato and Aristotle’, Southwest Philosophy Review, 1995. More recent 
work has challenged the cognition/emotion distinction itself, and stressed the ‘compositional intricacy’ of 
the emotions in Plato (involving both desire and cognition); see A. W. Price, ‘Emotions in Plato and 
Aristotle’, in Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 121-142. 
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The free intellect will see as God might see, without hopes and fears, … calmly, dispassionately 
[…and] will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of 
private history do not enter.4 
 
This kind of stance is increasingly common in our contemporary philosophical scene, 
particularly in much of the Anglophone academy. If you look at a typical article in one of today’s 
mainstream philosophy journals, you cannot fail to be struck by its dry, austere tone, suggesting 
that the author is trying to take an emotionally detached stance, judiciously evaluating the 
arguments and assessing the evidence, and treating philosophical inquiry as very much an 
impersonal and impartial enterprise. The style in philosophy journals is becoming more and more 
like that in science journals. And here it is no accident that a great many analytic philosophers are 
strongly influenced by what Brian Leiter has (admiringly) called the ‘naturalistic revolution’ in 
philosophy, where philosophy sees it as its role to ‘adopt and emulate the methods of the natural 
sciences, or work in tandem with them as its abstract and reflective branch.’ 5  
And yet despite the influence of the scientific model, and despite the exacting methodology of 
contemporary philosophy, the minute dissection of arguments, the rigorous treadmill of objections 
and counter-objections, it is striking that we are not one step nearer to agreement on any of the key 
issues on which philosophers are so divided, as they have been for hundreds of years. It’s extremely 
rare to find a philosopher who walks out of a seminar saying something like “that argument 
convinced me: I used to be a materialist, but now I’m a dualist”, or “I used to believe in free will, 
but now I’m a determinist.” Alasdair MacIntyre puts the point with remarkable honesty in his 
recent book Ethics and the Conflicts of Modernity when he says about his own philosophical 
stance: ‘I have worked my way slowly and painfully – the pain is sometimes … the pain of 
boredom – through the literature [in philosophy of mind and ethics] and … nothing in it has given 
me reason to abandon or to modify the views here expressed and the arguments here advanced.’ He 
goes on to put his finger on why this should be, when he admits that his own aim in writing is ‘not 
to secure [the] agreement [of my readers], since whether I do so or not depends in key part on the 
convictions and assumptions that they bring with them to their reading.’6  
I think there is something important here that philosophers need to be much more aware of. Of 
course arguments vary in quality, they can often be flawed, can be invalid, and careful analysis of 
their structure can often be useful in detecting the flaws. But once the flaws have been ironed out, 
whether a given argument resonates with you, whether it makes a difference to your outlook, is 
going to hinge on where it starts from: it depends on underlying assumptions and presuppositions 
that typically operate below the level of detached rational analysis. That is one reason why 
examples are often so telling in philosophy: often a lecturer can plough through whole sequences of 
PowerPoint slides with numbered premises and sub-premises, and the response from the audience 
will be furrowed brows or sceptical yawns. But a vivid example or anecdote can suddenly create a 
break-through in sympathy: now I can see where this position is coming from, or what is 
motivating it. As Wittgenstein saw, what often underlies a given philosophical stance is a certain 
‘picture’ of reality – a picture, as he put it, that ‘holds us captive’.7 And whether a picture captures 
your imagination is not just a matter of knowledge, or rational analysis – it is something far more 
complex. When we are dealing with the big traditional philosophical questions, about the nature of 
reality, our human place in the world, and how we should live our lives, the picture has to be one 																																																								
4 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy [1912] (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), Ch. 15, 
93. For an interesting discussion of the opposite position, see Katherine Dormandy, 'Argument from 
Personal Narrative’, Res Philosophica 93 (2016), 601-620. 
5 Brian Leiter, The Future for Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), Editor’s Introduction, 2–3. 
6 Alasdair MacIntyre, Ethics and the Conflicts of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), ix-x. 
7 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations [Philosophische Untersuchungen, 1953], transl. G. 
E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958), §115. 
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that comes alive for you, one you can with integrity live with and accept as making sense of who 
you are and how you relate to the world. 
I my recent work I have argued for a more ‘humane’ turn in philosophy – one that does not in 
any way reject the valuable tools of the analytic method, or its commitment to clarity and rigour, 
but which recognizes the need for additional resources – the need for deploying all the powers of 
the human mind, including our emotional and imaginative and empathetic modes of awareness.8 
This seems to me a point we ignore at our peril if we want to achieve true philosophical 
understanding – and this is especially relevant to branches of the subject like moral philosophy and 
the philosophy of religion. In an interview over twenty years ago Bernard Williams suggested that 
there might be something about ethical understanding that makes it inherently unsuited to be 
explored through the methods and techniques of analytic philosophy alone.9 The point seems to me 
to apply with even greater force to religious understanding; for the adoption or rejection of a 
theistic worldview is not nearly as dependent on purely intellectual assessments and arguments as is 
often implicitly supposed by philosophers of religion.  
Advocating a ‘humane’ turn in philosophy is not necessarily a matter of wanting philosophy of 
religion to be more ‘continental’: the old ‘analytic/continental’ dichotomy in philosophy has long 
been exposed as a very blunt instrument that ignores many important connections and cross 
currents. And in any case, in advocating a ‘humane turn’ in philosophy of religion I speak as 
someone who is trained in the analytic tradition and firmly committed to its guiding values of 
precision in language and tightness in argument. It is certainly not these values that are the 
problem; the problem is more about what Eleonore Stump has called the ‘cognitive hemianopia’ of 
many analytic philosophers of religion – the way their philosophical thinking about religion 
involves only ‘left brain’ skills (to use a problematic term, but a useful shorthand), meaning that 
their thinking has become curiously detached from the involved imaginative and emotional modes 
of awareness that are manifest in religious texts and religious life generally.10  
Taking account of these dimensions might help to rescue the subject from the dead end where 
much of it has got stuck. A lot of the current debate over religion has degenerated into a rather 
dreary standoff where militant atheists on the one side trade arguments with heavy duty theologians 
and philosophers of religion on the other: the sparks may fly, but there is very little meeting of 
minds, very little shifting of ground, and above all very little which could even begin to engage the 
unconvinced opponent. The only effect of the intellectual fireworks is to make the respondent 
devise ever more ingenious counter-arguments (a familiar phenomenon in many areas of 
philosophy). But philosophy is not, or should not be, just a clever intellectual game. The object 
should be to deepen our understanding of the reality we inhabit; and to do that, we need to engage 
our imagination and our emotions, for true philosophical understanding cannot be achieved in 
intellectual abstraction from the phenomena we are supposed to be studying – any more than we 
would expect a true understanding of music to be achieved simply by scrutinizing and evaluating 
the theories of musicologists and music theorists in isolation from any contact with the musical 
sounds themselves. 
 
2. The role of the emotions in understanding. 
So what is the role of the emotions in our grasp of the world we inhabit? There has been a fair 
amount of work on this topic in recent years. Michael Stocker has argued that emotional states such 
as anger and pity can have a vital role in directing and focusing our attention, thus radically 
affecting the way we perceive things: ‘they seek out and collect, even create, sustaining or 
concordant facts . . . which they then use to justify and sustain that emotion, which then leads to 																																																								
8 See John Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion: Towards a More Humane Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
9 In an interview on the philosophy of Nietzsche broadcast on the BBC World Service, 25 November 
1993.  
10 Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 24–25. See also 
note 22, below. 
	 4 
further seeking, collecting, creating and coloring.’11 Similarly, Mark Wynn has argued that 
emotions have a role in ‘guiding enquiry by constituting patterns of salience’.12 But the role is not 
merely a heuristic one – it is not just that emotions are helpful in directing our attention in certain 
suggestive ways. As Peter Goldie has argued ‘coming to think of [the world] in [a] new way is not 
to be understood as consisting of thinking of it in the old way, plus some added-on phenomenal 
ingredient – feeling perhaps; rather, the whole way of experiencing, or being conscious of, the 
world is new… The difference between thinking of X as Y without feeling and thinking of X as Y 
with feeling will not just comprise a different attitude towards the same content – a thinking which 
earlier was without feeling and now is with feeling. The difference also lies in the content, although 
it might be that this difference cannot be captured in words.’13 
The idea here is that emotion doesn’t merely function as a kind of extraneous add-on, like the 
salt added to the popcorn, which leaves the structure of the popcorn exactly the same. It’s more like 
the yeast added to the flour which radically changes the properties of the resulting bread. No doubt 
there are questions that could be raised about this model, but it is useful I think in helping us to 
question, or deconstruct, the sharp dichotomy between the cognitive and the affective or emotional 
domains – as if the former were a matter of pure objective content, while the latter is merely our 
own subjective reaction. For there may be whole areas of life where we are cognitively blind, blind 
to the relevant content, if our emotions are not operating as they should.  
In short, there may be certain aspects of reality that simply cannot be discerned via the cold, 
unemotional tools of rational analysis. To go back to the example of music, the beauty and power 
of a given composition simply cannot be captured or discerned via the methods and techniques of 
musicological analysis. What that theoretical analysis does is to map out certain abstract or formal 
structures, which are of course important and essential to the identity of the composition in question, 
but which do not disclose its power and beauty. To see why, we simply have to imagine the case of 
someone who is a musicological expert, who has passed all the relevant examinations , and can 
identify the relevant formal patterns with supreme skill, yet who is tone deaf, for example, and so 
entirely lacking in the kind of sensibility we have in mind when we call someone ‘musical’. To be 
musical in this latter sense, to be capable of responding to the properties in question, you have to 
have the right kind of feeling and emotional responsiveness. 
Consider another example: the ability to perceive the beauties of nature, the vivid colour and 
variety of an alpine meadow in springtime, for instance, or the grandeur and splendour of the fells 
in the Lake District. As the poetry of William Wordsworth makes brilliantly clear, the kind of 
awareness involved in our perception of such natural wonders is in large part an emotional 
awareness. Those who look on the scene with a cold or clinical eye will see other aspects perhaps, 
but some of the beauties will simply pass them by. This I think is what Wordsworth means by the 
enigmatic lines: 
  
Nature never did betray  
The heart that loved her; ’tis her privilege 
Through all the years of this our life, to lead 
From joy to joy: for she can so inform 
The mind that is within us … 
[that nothing has the power to shake] 
Our cheerful faith that all that we behold 																																																								
11 Michael Stocker with Elizabeth Hegeman, Valuing Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 94.  
12 Mark Wynn, ‘The relationship of religion and ethics’, Heythrop Journal, 2005. See also M. Wynn, 
Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception Conception, and Feeling 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
13 Peter Goldie, The Emotions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 59f. For a more extended development 
of this theme see John Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), Ch. 5. 
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Is full of blessings. 14 
 
The ‘informing’, the delivery of the right kind of awareness that enables us to see the truth of 
what is there, requires a certain kind of emotional sensibility, a loving openness to the reality spread 
out before us. (hence ‘never did betray the heart that loved her). 
As a final example, consider the dynamics of a loving personal relationship, where the qualities 
that draw a couple together in mutual involvement are often not such as to be fully grasped and 
appreciated by the detached spectator or coldly impartial observer. As Gregory the Great observed 
in the sixth century, amor ipse notitia est - love is itself a form of knowledge.15 Part of what this 
entails, I take it, is that love is not simply a non-cognitive impulse or feeling which happens to arise 
in one person when they make contact with another. Perhaps there are certain kinds of attraction or 
arousal that are like that. But when there is genuine love and commitment, those involved have a 
certain kind of intimate knowledge of each other – they are aware of more dimensions, and deeper 
dimensions, of the other person’s nature than could be accessed if no loving emotion were present. 
The couple’s understanding of each other, to borrow a phrase from the twelfth-century Benedictine, 
William of Saint-Thierry, becomes ‘an understanding of enlightened love’.16 
 
3. The case of Descartes 
From these general observations on the rich cognitive role of certain emotions in our understanding 
of reality (in the domains of music, of the natural world, and of personal relationship), let me turn 
more specifically to religious understanding. Some people may object that if the phrase ‘religious 
understanding’ is supposed to refer to our understanding of God, then there can be no such 
understanding, since there is no such reality. This calls to mind a letter to press by Richard 
Dawkins in 1991 calling for the resignation of the then Regius Professor of Theology at Oxford on 
the grounds that there was no such subject as theology (the implication being that theology is 
supposed to be the study of God, but in fact no such being exists).17 So to avoid begging any 
questions here, let us agree for present purposes to put the issue of God’s existence or otherwise on 
one side. What is undisputed is that many of the great canonical philosophers of the Western 
tradition have been religious believers, and so it is of some interest to know what role they 
considered the emotions as having in their awareness of God. 
René Descartes placed God at the centre of his philosophical system (though this is an aspect of 
his philosophy that is often glossed over nowadays). But his approach to God is normally 
considered to be a purely intellectual one – indeed Descartes is typically classified as a ‘rationalist’ 
philosopher, a leading figure in the ‘Age of Reason’, to quote the title of a widely used short survey 
of seventeenth-century philosophy by Stuart Hampshire.18 And the label ‘rationalist’ tends to 
suggest the aspiration to build a philosophical system a priori, using the pure light of reason, 
without reliance on the fluctuating and unreliable data from the senses, let alone the murky and 
confused influence of the emotions. 
It is quite true that Descartes does start his philosophical masterpiece, the Meditations with 
arguments designed to lead the mind away from the senses (here he very much follows in the 
tradition of Plato, and of Augustine). But to those brought up on an exclusively rationalistic view of 
Descartes, it maybe surprising to find that the text of his philosophical masterpiece, the Meditations 
uses quite dramatic and emotionally involved language at key points in the argument. The 																																																								
14 William Wordsworth, ‘Lines Written a few miles above Tintern Abbey’ [1798].  
15 Gregory the Great, Homelia in Evangelium 27.4, in Patrologia Latina, ed. J, Migne, 76, 1207; cited in 
Denys Turner, The Darkness of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 222. 
16 ‘intellectus amoris illuminati’ Expositio super Cantica Canticorum [c. 1138], XIX, 90; cited in the 
encyclical letter of Pope Francis, Lumen Fidei [2013], §22.  
17 The episode is discussed in Keith Ward, Why There Almost Certainly Is a God (Oxford: Lion Books, 
2008), 7. 
18 For the use of this term to characterize the era of the seventeenth-century ‘rationalists’, see Stuart 
Hampshire, The Age of Reason (New York: Mentor, 1956). 
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‘hyperbolical’ doubts of the First Meditation, where Descartes conjures up nightmare scenarios of 
‘demons, dreamers and madmen’19, questioning even his own ability to reason coherently from 
moment to moment, end up at the close of the Meditation with a expression of fear – the fear of 
being cut off from the light and having to struggle amid ‘inextricable darkness’.20 The term 
Descartes uses for ‘darkness’ in the original Latin text of the Meditations is tenebrae – a term that 
resonated with religious significance in the culture in which Descartes was raised. The ancient 
Tenebrae liturgy for Holy Week commemorates the ‘darkness’ that fell over the land at the death of 
Christ – a darkness eventually to be dispersed as the day breaks on Easter morning. It does not need 
any explicit allusion in Descartes’s text for these connotations to have been subliminally operative 
for his contemporary readers: the darkness of ignorance and confusion will be dispelled by the 
‘immense light’ that appears at the end of the Third Meditation.  
And when the meditator finally finds his way out of the darkness by establishing the existence 
of God – the source of light and truth – he expresses himself in decidedly emotive language: ‘Here 
I should like to pause and spend some time in the contemplation of God … and gaze at, wonder at 
and adore the beauty of this immense light.’21 In the original, the Latin verbs piled one upon 
another, intueri, admirari, adorare, ring out almost like a litany, or prayer, and the faculties 
involved are not just intellectual. Notice that wonder is involved – and wonder is one of the 
passions that was later to be discussed by Descartes in his Passions of the Soul, the last work 
published in his lifetime. God, the source of the ‘light of reason’ emerges at the end of the Third 
Meditation not as epistemic guarantor of the axioms for science (that will come later), but as the 
fountain of truth and goodness, the ‘immense light’ towards which finite creatures must reach out, 
not just in a spirit of cold rational inquiry, but in awe and wonder. The light is not fully perceived, 
but glimpsed only, as Descartes puts it, ‘in so far as the eye of my darkened intellect can bear it’; 
and he immediately goes on in the closing sentence of the Third Meditation to speak of how it 
arouses joy (in Latin, voluptas). So we find yet another passion explicitly making an appearance.22 
It would, I think, be a great mistake to dismiss these references to the emotions and the passions 
as simply rhetorical flourishes, irrelevant to the ‘real philosophy’, or to the content of the argument. 
For what the Third Meditation is ultimately describing is an encounter of the finite mind with the 
infinite – something that Hilary Putnam (following the interpretation of Emmanuel Levinas) has 
described as not so much a step in a deductive reasoning, as ‘a profound religious experience’. He 
goes on to call it ‘an experience which might be described as the experience of a fissure, of a 
confrontation with something that disrupted all his categories. On this reading, Descartes is not so 
much proving something as acknowledging something, acknowledging a Reality that he could not 
have constructed …’23  
In Descartes’s own comments on his strategy in the Meditations, we find something that seems 
to me further evidence that his quest for God is not confined to the ‘left-brain’ mode of detached 
																																																								
19 The phrase is from Harry Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in 
Descartes’s Meditations (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1970). For ‘hyperbolical’ doubt, see Descartes, Sixth 
Meditation, AT VII 89: CSM II 61. In this paper, ‘AT’ refers to the standard Franco-Latin edition of 
Descartes by C. Adam & P. Tannery, Œuvres de Descartes (12 vols, revised edn, Paris: Vrin/CNRS, 1964-
76); ‘CSM’ refers to the English translation by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vols I and II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and 
‘CSMK’ to vol. III, The Correspondence, by the same translators and A. Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, l991). 
20 AT VII 23: CSM II 15. 
21 AT VII 52: CSM II 36. 
22 The former, says Descartes, is apprehended through faith, the latter known by experience. Third 
Meditation, AT VII 52; CSM II 36. 
23 Hilary Putnam, ‘Levinas and Judaism’, in S, Critchley and R. Bernasconi (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to Levinas (Cambridge, 1986), 33-70, at 42. The relevant Levinas text is Ethique et infini [1982], 
transl. as Ethics and Infinity (Pittsburgh, 1985), 91ff. 
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reasoning and abstract intellectual analysis alone.24 He observes that when we attend to the 
perfections of God, we should not so much try to understand them as to surrender to them, or, in 
the graphic Latin phrase, non tam capere quam capi – not so much to grasp them as to be grasped 
by them.25 Surrender, humility, submission, awe, wonder – these notions speak not simply of not 
dry detached modes of analysis and inference, but of modes of awareness in which the emotions are 
inextricably involved. 
 
4. Emotions and intellect in synergy 
In drawing attention to these perhaps under-appreciated aspects of Descartes’s way of 
philosophizing, I am not trying to downplay the importance of careful intellectual analysis in his 
thought. Indeed, in the same passage as Descartes talks of surrendering to or being ‘grasped by’ the 
perfections of God, he also speaks of ‘using all the strength of the intellect’ to contemplate them. It 
is not a case of ‘either/or’, of ‘either the intellect or the passions’, but rather of a philosophical 
journey in which both play an important role. This ‘synergy’ of the intellect and the emotions can I 
think also be seen in Descartes’s near contemporary, Blaise Pascal, whose approach to religion is 
typically interpreted as a highly emotional one – at the other end of the spectrum from the 
supposedly ultra-rationalistic Descartes. Pascal’s description of his conversion experience, his 
‘night of fire’ in November 1654 is well known: he speaks of ‘tears of joy’, at having found God – 
the God not of the philosophers but of a living tradition of faith. One of the best known dicta of 
Pascal is ‘C’est le coeur qui sent Dieu, et non la raison’ (‘it is our heart that senses God, not our 
reason’).26 But Pascal went on to allow that rational and emotional awareness can cooperate in 
bringing us to the truth: ‘nous connaissons la vérité non seulement par la raison, mais encore par 
le cœur’ (‘we know the truth not only by reason, but also by the heart’).27 So Pascal does not rule 
out the possibility that the perceptions of the heart can complement the deliverances of reason. 
This connects up with a thesis that I argued for elsewhere, namely that we need a new 
epistemology for thinking about religious belief and its basis. Many modern critics of religion, 
including most of the so-called ‘new atheists’, seem to operate with an epistemology of control – 
and this is also true of many theologians and philosophical defenders of religion. The idea is that 
we should scrutinize the evidence from a detached standpoint, in a ‘left-brain’ kind of way, and 
decide on the existence or otherwise of God. But there are several reasons to doubt the validity of 
such a strategy. To be sure, it may be reasonable enough to assume that if the theistic world view is 
correct, there should be evidence for its truth; and certainly, from a theological perspective a loving 
God would presumably want his creatures to have some awareness of him.28 But it does not follow 
that such awareness should be achievable via intellectual analysis of formal arguments or 
observational data. One the contrary, classical theism, both in Judaism and Christianity, posits a 
Deus absconditus, a God who is at least partly hidden, and who is less interested in proving his 
existence or demonstrating his power than in the moral and spiritual development of his creatures 
and in deepening the understanding of those who ‘seek him with all their heart’, in Pascal’s 
phrase.29  
																																																								
24 For more on the distinction between left and right brain modes of awareness, the former detached, 
analytical, impersonal, the latter more intuitive, imaginative and holistic, see Iain McGilchrist, The Master 
and His Emissary (New Haven, 2009). It should be added that associating these two modes of awareness 
with the right and left hemispheres, respectively, is something of a schematic approximation, as McGilchrist 
himself stresses. There is evidence to suggest that in most people the respective functions do broadly 
correlate with neural activity in the relevant halves of the brain, but in normal subjects there is constant 
interaction between the halves. 
25 AT VII 114; CSM II 82. 
26 Blaise Pascal, Pensées [1670], ed. L. Lafuma (Paris: Seuil, 1962), no. 424.  
27 Pascal, Pensées, ed. Lafuma, no. 110. 
28 Compare John Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
29 Pascal, Pensées, ed. Lafuma, no. 427. 
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Given this, we should not expect the evidence for God’s existence to be ‘spectator evidence’, to 
use Paul Moser’s label – the kind of evidence that is can be scrutinized and assessed irrespective of 
the moral stance of the inquirer. 30 In short, we may need to relinquish the epistemology of control, 
and substitute an epistemology of receptivity – one that posits truths that are accessible only to those 
who are suitably receptive. After all, there are many other areas of life, including those mentioned 
earlier – appreciation of poetry, or of music, for instance, or entering into any kind of personal 
relationship – where in order to achieve proper knowledge and awareness we need to be ‘porous’, 
to use Martha Nussbaum’s term: not hard, detached, critical evaluators, but open, yielding, 
receptive listeners.31 By always priding ourselves on being in control and insisting on ‘spectator 
evidence’ that we can inspect from a distance, we may be hardening ourselves against the very 
possibility of our being able to perceive the truth.32 
So perhaps philosophers should be, if I may put it this way, more ‘holistic’ in their approach: 
when investigating a given set of claims, or a given class of phenomena, they should take more 
account of the way the emotions and the intellect need to work in synergy. This does not mean that 
our philosophizing about religion should be wild and woolly, or that we should downplay the 
importance of evidence in the formation and retention of religious belief. The point rather, as 
William Wainwright has put it, is that ‘mature religious belief can, and perhaps should, be based on 
evidence, but … the evidence can be accurately assessed only by men and women who possess the 
proper moral and spiritual qualifications’.33 To this we could add that acquiring such qualifications 
cannot be a purely cerebral matter, but must involve a deepening of our sensibilities and emotions. 
Wittgenstein is famous for pointing out that understanding the meaning of a given sentence cannot 
operate atomistically or in isolation, but it requires entering into the form of life of which it is a part. 
So rather than assuming, as much philosophy of religion has tended to do, that we can analyse and 
dissect the ‘cognitive content’ of religious claims, and evaluate their truth in isolation from the 
religious practices that give them life and meaning, there may be good reason to start at the other 
end, as it were, and look at what religious people do, in their liturgy, in their religious practices and 
rituals and activities, before we presume to extract the supposed doxastic ingredients and 
pronounce on their tenability or otherwise. 
Once we start looking at religious praxis, as opposed to abstract doctrine, the role of the 
emotions will become strikingly apparent. Thus William Wainwright, whom I mentioned a moment 
ago, has recently drawn attention to the role played by the ‘ingestion’ of sacred texts. Here he 
follows up a point made earlier by Paul Griffiths that in many traditions, especially before the 
invention of printing, repeated reciting, chanting, memorizing and reflecting on the scriptures had 
the effect of making the text enter ‘into the fabric of [one’s] intellectual and emotional life in a way 
that makes deep claims upon that life’ 34 The result of such spiritual formation is not just a 
subjective matter of private ‘feelings’ but a profound shift in emotional outlook that can make a 
crucial difference to the way we see the world. 
 
5. Caveats and conclusions 
It is time to draw the threads together, to make some qualifications and to consider some possible 
objections. The standard terms I have been using, ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ are rather crude labels, 
suggesting discrete compartments in the mind – a picture that probably bears little relation to how 																																																								
30 Paul Moser, The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 47. 
31 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Love’s Knowledge’ [1988], reprinted in Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 81-2. 
32 For more on these themes, see John Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
33 William Wainwright, Reason, Revelation, and Devotion (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 60. 
34 Paul Griffiths, Religious Reading: The Place of Reading the Practice of Religion (New York: Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 45-7 (cited in Wainwright, Reason, Revelation and Devotion, 50. 
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our minds actually work. The modes of awareness that are grouped under the rubric of ‘the 
emotional’ are in some cases better described as imaginative modes of awareness, ways in which 
we reach out and come to terms with the complexity and wonder of the world we inhabit. 
Wordsworth called imagination ‘Reason in her most exalted mood’,35 and clearly it plays as crucial 
role in human culture as scientific reasoning does.  
One of the chief vehicles for the imagination is myth, which is an inescapable part of human 
culture. One thinks here not just of archetypal stories of our origins (such as the Genesis narrative), 
but a whole range of symbolic human activity – what Graham Ward has called the ‘symbolic 
realms we hominids have been cultivating for 2.2 million years’. In ways we cannot fully explain, 
these interlocking modes of human culture, including art, poetry, rite and dance, tap the powers of 
what (for a want of a better term) we call the imagination, which operates at many more levels than 
are accessed by our conscious reflective awareness. Such work, as Ward puts it, ‘intimate that our 
experience … of being in the world is freighted with a significance that only an appeal to the 
mythic can index.’36 However much philosophers may implicitly assume the contrary, the maps 
drawn by the analytic intellect are very far from capturing the whole truth of the world around us. 
Poetry, myth, symbol, and story can express truths and insights that can’t adequately be captured in 
other ways, and they do so by tapping into our emotional and imaginative modes of awareness.37 
But clearly the emotion and the imagination can lead us astray. Martin Heidegger’s imagination 
and emotion was so captivated by myths of ancient German purity and courage as to lead him 
straight into the arms of the Nazis. And on a more mundane and everyday level, we all know how 
the passions can cloud our judgement. As Descartes warned, ‘Often passion makes us believe 
certain things to be much better and more desirable than they are; then, when we have taken much 
trouble to acquire them, and in the process lost the chance of possessing other more genuine goods, 
possession of them brings home to us their defects; and thence arise dissatisfaction, regret and 
remorse.38 
Descartes goes on to say that the true function of reason is to examine ‘without passion’ the true 
value of the goods before us, so that we can rank them in proper order. But as I hope has emerged 
by now, this is a forlorn hope, if it is supposed to envisage a pure rational hotline to the truth and 
value of things. Philosophers who claim to speak with the pure voice of reason are certainly not 
immune to the influence of what lies beneath the surface of their supposedly dispassionate 
deliberations. Bertrand Russell, a philosopher of undeniable intellectual brilliance, notoriously once 
argued for embarking on a preventive nuclear war against the Soviet Union if it continued its 
aggressive policies: his calm rational assessment of the facts and the probabilities had led him to 
this conclusion – hardly the best endorsement for philosophical rationality.39 As I observed at the 
start of this paper, whether a given argument carries conviction for you depends in large part on the 
assumptions and presuppositions you bring to it, and you do not have to go along with everything 
Freud said about the unconscious to realize that the mind is very far from being a transparent 
goldfish bowl whose contents are all there waiting to be scrutinized as assessed. When reason is 
linked to arrogance and lack of self-awareness, it can lead to dangerous conclusions. 
Just as the emotions and passions are not raw feelings, unable to contribute anything to our 
cognitive grasp of the world, so reason does not operate in some timeless noumenal realm, but is 
always to a greater or lesser extent a product of the complex contingencies that shape an 
individual’s outlook. We can try to achieve a balanced view, to engage all our faculties as we try to 
shape the best picture of the world we can manage, but nothing in philosophy is self-certifying – 
there is no guaranteed hot line to the truth. But what can be said is that if we truncate the 																																																								
35 William Wordsworth, The Prelude [1850 version), Book 14, line 237. 
36 Graham Ward, Unbelievable: Why We Believe and Why We Don’t (London: Tauris, 2014), 186. 
37 See Wainwright, Reason, Revelation and Devotion, 148. 
38 Descartes, letter of 1 September 1645 (AT IV 284-5: CSMK 264).  
39 In a BBC interview with John Freeman in March 1959 Russell was asked if it was true that he had 
advocated that a preventive war might be made against Soviet Russia; he replied ‘it’s entirely true, and I 
don’t repent of it.’ Full details are cited in Ronald Clark, The Life of Bertrand Russell, Ch. 19.  
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imaginative and passional part of ourselves, all we achieve is a colourless picture of reality that 
may lead us astray just as much as the wilder flights of imaginative fancy. 
So where all does this leave religion? Philosophers have had very contrasting views of the 
respective roles of reason and passion in religious belief. For Kierkegaard, faith arises out of the 
‘infinite passion of the individual’s inwardness’ which ‘holds fast to objective uncertainty, so as to 
remain out upon the deep, over seventy thousand fathoms of water’.40 For others, from Thomas 
Aquinas in many of his writings, down to so many of our contemporary philosophers of religion, it 
arises from a dispassionate rational assessment of arguments and evidence that are supposed to be 
valid and to carry conviction in the eyes of any impartial judge. I hope I have said enough to raise 
serious concerns about this latter picture, though that does not mean I am advocating a rebound to 
the Kierkegaardian approach, which also seems to me problematic in important respects. We need a 
middle way between the two extremes just mentioned, one that allows for a fruitful co-operation 
between intellect and emotions. Let me close by illustrating this with reference to the phenomenon 
of religious conversion.  
I know of few if any people who have changed from atheist to believer, or vice versa, as a result 
of detached rational argument and assessment of evidence alone. And conversely, I know few 
believers who would be happy about the Kierkegaardian option of passionate commitment in the 
teeth of reason and evidence. What I think characteristically happens involves a synergy of reason 
and emotion of the kind outlined in the previous section. 
In Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, there is a striking example of this, not in the life of the doomed 
eponymous heroine, but in the life of other main character, Konstantin Levin, who undergoes a 
religious conversion in the closing stages of the novel. What happens is radical shift in Levin’s 
hitherto sceptical and detached outlook about religion – a shift that comes about when he faces a 
crisis in his life (the risk of his wife Kitty’s dying in childbirth at the term of her first pregnancy). 
Tolstoy describes how Levin feels as his wife goes into labour and he is confronted with the very 
real danger that process poses to her life. His perceptions shift – he sees for the first time her true 
beauty and integrity, and simultaneously his heart is opened to the mystery and fragility and 
wonder and terror of life and of love, and he begins to pray. His decision could never have been 
arrived at by cold scrutiny of the evidence. But only a religious framework is now adequate for 
interpreting the momentous truths to which his heart has now been opened. He prays to God, and 
repeats the words ‘not just with his lips’. He believes. 
The crucial point being made here is that conversion is not simply accepting that God exists – 
indeed it is hard to see how mere assent to this proposition could in itself carry any moral or 
spiritual significance whatever. Rather, it involves a moral transformation – a transformation from 
the relatively self-sufficient and confident individual that Levin had been to someone who 
acknowledges his vulnerability and dependency. And this of course is consistent with the 
assumptions of classical theism, in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, that what God requires is not 
intellectual assent, but metanoia, repentance, change of heart, deepening of moral sensibility, in all 
of which processes the emotions are inextricably involved. The process is not, however, a blind or 
irrational one – Tolstoy describes how Levin continues to examine his position intellectually, 
wrestles with certain doubts, and by the end of the novel finds that his new found faith has been 
consolidated, for he cannot with integrity accept that the insights he arrived at during the crisis 
were mistaken. A complex amalgam of new perceptions and feelings has, says Tolstoy, ‘entered 
into him through suffering’ and ‘firmly lodged itself in his soul’.41  
What happens, in short, is that my character, as I confront the world, starts to undergo a radical 
shift, and simultaneously my perception of the world changes, and new realities are disclosed. 																																																								
40 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript [Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift , 1846], 
trans. D. F. Swenson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941), 182. 
41 Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina [1878], Part VIII Ch. 19, transl. R. Pevear and L. Volokhonski (London: 
Penguin, 2001), 817. My discussion in this and the previous paragraph draws on material from Ch. 6 of John 
Cottingham, Why Believe? (London: Continuum, 2009). 
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Wittgenstein once observed that ‘life can educate you to belief in God’.42 And perhaps it is not at all 
surprising that an emotional, moral and spiritual shift can accomplish what merely intellectual 
theorizing alone is powerless to do.. So many of the significant changes in our lives are like that: 
reason or intellect may be a crucial part of who we are, but in such cases it often lags behind. 
Before we can see, before we can believe, the interior response has to occur. In a way that is in 
some ways analogous to what happens in the psychotherapeutic context, it is the lowering of the 
hard defences of the controlling intellect that allows growth and healing.43. Wittgenstein, who never 
himself managed to make the shift to becoming a believer, nevertheless gave articulate voice to this 
idea in a manuscript of 1937: ‘The edifice of your pride has to be dismantled. And that means 
frightful work’.44 Dismantling the edifice of pride is a task in which both reason and the emotions 
are involved; or perhaps we should simply say that the old opposition between reason and the 
passions no longer applies, for the whole person is reshaped and renewed. 
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42 Ludwig Wittgenstein, from a MS of 1950, in Culture and Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 97. See 
further John Cottingham, ‘The Lessons of Life: Wittgenstein, Religion and Analytic Philosophy’ in H.-J. 
Glock and J. Hyman and (eds), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P.M.S. Hacker (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 203-227. 
43 See John Cottingham, Philosophy and the Good Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
Ch. 4.  
44 ‘Das Gebäude Deines Stolzes ist abzutragen. Und das gibt furchtbare Arbeit.’ From a MS of 1937, in 
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